Abstract. Dependently typed programs contain an excessive amount of static terms which are necessary to please the type checker but irrelevant for computation. To separate static and dynamic code, several static analyses and type systems have been put forward. We consider Pfenning's type theory with irrelevant quantification which is compatible with a type-based notion of equality that respects η-laws. We extend Pfenning's theory to universes and large eliminations and develop its meta-theory. Subject reduction, normalization and consistency are obtained by a Kripke model over the typed equality judgement. Finally, a type-directed equality algorithm is described whose completeness is proven by a second Kripke model.
Introduction and Related Work
Dependently typed programming languages such as Agda [BDN09] , Coq [INR10] , and Epigram [MM04] allow the programmer to express in one language programs, their types, rich invariants, and even proofs of these invariants. Besides code executed at run-time, dependently typed programs contain much code needed only to please the type checker, which is at the same time the verifier of the proofs woven into the program.
Program extraction takes type-checked terms and discards parts that are irrelevant for execution. Augustsson's dependently typed functional language Cayenne [Aug99] erases types using a universe-based analysis. Coq's extraction procedure has been designed by Paulin-Mohring and Werner [PMW93] and Letouzey [Let02] and discards not only types but also proofs. The erasure rests on Coq's universe-based separation between propositional (Prop) and computational parts (Set/Type). The rigid Prop/Set distinction has the drawback of code duplication: A structure which is sometimes used statically and sometimes dynamically needs to be coded twice, once in Prop and once in Set.
An alternative to the fixed Prop/Set-distinction is to let the usage context decide whether a term is a proof or a program. Besides whole-program analyses such as data 
Irrelevant Intensional Type Theory
In this section, we present Irrelevant Intensional Type Theory IITT which features two of Pfenning's function spaces [Pfe01] , the ordinary "extensional" (x : U ) → T and the proof irrelevant (x÷U ) → T . The main idea is that the argument of a (x÷U ) → T function is counted as a proof and can neither be returned nor eliminated on, it can only be passed as argument to another proof irrelevant function or data constructor. Technically, this is realized by annotating variables as relevant, x : U , or irrelevant, x÷U , in the typing context, to confine occurrences of irrelevant variables to irrelevant arguments.
Expression and context syntax. We distinguish between relevant (t : u or simply t u) and irrelevant application (t ÷ u). Accordingly, we have relevant (λx : U. T ) and irrelevant abstraction (λx÷U. T ). Our choice of typed abstraction is not fundamental; a bidirectional type-checking algorithm [Coq96] can reconstruct type and relevance annotations at abstractions and applications.
Var ∋ x, y, X, Y Sort ∋ s ::= Set k (k ∈ N) universes Ann ∋ ⋆ ::= ÷ | : annotation: irrelevant, relevant
Exp ∋ t, u, T, U ::= s | (x⋆U )
s,s ′ → T sort, (ir)relevant function type | x | λx⋆U. t | t ⋆ u lambda-calculus Cxt ∋ Γ, ∆ ::= ⋄ | Γ. x⋆T empty, (ir)relevant extension Expressions are considered modulo α-equality, we write t ≡ t ′ when we want to stress that t and t ′ identical (up to α). Similarly, we consider variables bound in a context to be distinct, and when opening a term binder we will implicitly use α-conversion to add a fresh variable in the context.
For technical reasons, namely, to prove transitivity (Lemma 4.3) of the Kripke logical relation in Section 4, we explicitly annotate function types (x⋆U )
s,s ′ → T with the sorts s of domain U and s ′ of codomain T . We may omit the annotation if it is inessential or determined by the context of discourse. In case T does not mention x, we may write U → T for (x : U ) → T .
Sorts. IITT is a pure type system (PTS) with infinite hierarchy of predicative universes Set 0 : Set 1 : .... The universes are not cumulative. We have the PTS axioms Axiom = {(Set i , Set i+1 ) | i ∈ N} and the rules Rule = {(Set i , Set j , Set max(i,j) ) | i, j ∈ N}. As is customary, we will write the side condition (s, s ′ ) ∈ Axiom just as (s, s ′ ) and likewise (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ Rule just as (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ). IITT is a full and functional PTS, which means that for all s 1 , s 2 there is exactly one s 3 such that (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ). There is no subtyping, so that types-and thus, sorts-are unique up to equality. A proof of sort unicity might relieve us from the sort annotation in function types, however, we obtain sort discrimination too late in our technical development (Lemma 5.10).
Substitutions. Substitutions σ are maps from variables to expressions. We require that the domain dom(σ) = {x | σ(x) = x} is finite. We write id for the identity substitution and [u/x] for the singleton substitution σ such that σ(x) := u and σ(y) := y for y = x. Substitution extension (σ, u/x) is formally defined as σ ⊎ [u/x]. Capture avoiding parallel substitution of σ in t is written as juxtaposition tσ.
IRRELEVANCE IN TYPE THEORY 5
Contexts. Contexts Γ feature two kinds of bindings, relevant (x : U ) and irrelevant (x ÷ U ) ones. The intuition, implemented by the typing rules below, is that only relevant variables are in scope in an expression. Resurrection Γ ÷ turns all irrelevant bindings (x ÷ T ) into the corresponding relevant ones (x : T ) [Pfe01] . It is the tool to make irrelevant variables, also called proof variables, available in proofs. The generalization Γ ⋆ shall mean Γ ÷ if ⋆ = ÷, and just Γ otherwise. We write Γ.∆ for the concatenation of Γ and ∆; herein, we suppose dom(Γ) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅.
Primitive judgements of IITT. The following three judgements are mutually inductively defined by the rules given below and in Figure 1 .
In context Γ, t and t ′ are equal expressions of type T .
Derived judgements. To simplify notation, we introduce the following four abbreviations:
Γ ⊢ t ⋆ T may mean Γ ⊢ t : T or Γ ⊢ t ÷ T , depending on the value of placeholder ⋆; same for Γ ⊢ t = t ′ ⋆ T . We sometimes write Γ ⊢ t, t ′ ⋆ T to abbreviate the conjunction of Γ ⊢ t ⋆ T and Γ ⊢ t ′ ⋆ T . The notation Γ ⊢ T, T ′ is to be understood similarly.
2.1. Rules. Our rules for well-typed terms Γ ⊢ t : T extend Reed's rules [Ree02] to PTS style. There are only 6 rules; we shall introduce them one-by-one.
Variable rule. Only relevant variables can be extracted from the context. ⊢ Γ (x : U ) ∈ Γ Γ ⊢ x : U There is no variable rule for irrelevant bindings (x ÷ U ) ∈ Γ, in particular, the judgement x÷U ⊢ x : U is not derivable. This essentially forbids proofs to appear in relevant positions.
Abstraction rule. Relevant and irrelevant functions are introduced analogously.
s,s ′ → T To check a relevant function λx : U. t, we introduce a relevant binding x : U into the context and continue checking the function body t. In case of an irrelevant function λx÷U. t, we proceed with an irrelevant binding x ÷ U . This means that an irrelevant function cannot computationally depend on its argument-it is essentially a constant function. In particular, λx÷U. x is never well-typed.
As a side condition, we also need to check that the introduced function type (x⋆U ) s,s ′ → T is well-sorted; the rule is given below. 
This rule uses our overloaded notations for bindings ⋆, that can be specialized into two different instances for relevant and irrelevant applications.
For relevant functions, we get the ordinary dependently-typed application rule:
When applying an irrelevant function, we resurrect the context before checking the function argument.
This means that irrelevant variables become relevant and can be used in u. The intuition is that the application t ÷ u does not computationally depend on u, thus, u may refer to any variable, even the "forbidden ones". One may think of u as a proof which may refer to both ordinary and proof variables.
For example, let Γ = f : (y÷U ) → U . Then the irrelevant η-expansion λx÷U. f ÷ x is well-typed in Γ, with the following derivation:
Observe how the status of x changes for irrelevant to relevant when we check the argument of f .
Sorting rules. These are the "Axioms" and the "Rules" of PTSs to form types.
The rule for irrelevant function type formation follows Reed [Ree02] .
It states that the codomain of an irrelevant function cannot depend relevantly on the function argument. This fact is crucial for the construction of our semantics in Section 4. Note that it rules out polymorphism in the sense of Barras and Bernado's Implicit Calculus of Constructions ICC * [BB08] and Mishra-Linger and Sheard's Erasure Pure Type Systems EPTS [MLS08] ; the type (X÷Set 0 ) → (x : X) → X is ill-formed in IITT, but not in ICC * or EPTS. In EPTS, there is the following rule:
It allows the codomain T of an irrelevant function to arbitrarily depend on the function argument x. This is fine in an erasure semantics, but incompatible with our typed semantics in the presence of large eliminations; we will detail the issues in examples 2.3 and 2.8.
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Another variant is Pfenning's rule for irrelevant function type formation [Pfe01] .
It allows the domain of an irrelevant function to make use of irrelevant variables in scope. It does not give polymorphism, e. g., (X÷Set 0 ) → (x : X) → X is still ill-formed. However, (X÷Set 0 ) → (x÷X) → X would be well-formed. It is unclear how the equality rule for irrelevant function types would look like-it is not given by Pfenning [Pfe01] . The rule
would mean that any two irrelevant function types are equal as long as their codomains are equal-their domains are irrelevant. This is not compatible with our typed semantics and seems a bit problematic in general.
2
Type conversion rule. We have typed conversion, thus, strictly speaking, IITT is not a PTS, but a Pure Type System with Judgemental Equality [Ada06] .
Equality. Figure 1 recapitulates the typing rules and lists the rules to derive context wellformedness ⊢ Γ and equality Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T . Equality is the least congruence over the β-and η-axioms. Since equality is typed we can extend IITT to include an extensional unit type (Section 7). Let us inspect the congruence rule for application:
In case of relevant functions (⋆ = :) we obtain the usual dependently-typed application rule of equality. Otherwise, we get:
Note that the arguments u and u ′ to the irrelevant functions need to be well-typed but not related to each other. This makes precise the intuition that t and t ′ are constant functions.
2.2. Simple properties of IITT. In the following, we prove two basic invariants of derivable IITT-judgements: The context is always well-formed, and judgements remain derivable under well-formed context extensions (weakening).
Proof. By a simple induction on the derivations. ⊢ Figure 1 : Rules of IITT It should be noted that we only prove the most basic well-formedness statements here. One would expect that Γ ⊢ t : T or Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T also implies Γ ⊢ T , or that Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T implies Γ ⊢ t : T . This is true-and we will refer to these implications as syntactic validity-but this cannot be proven without treatment of substitution, due to the typing rule for application, which requires substitution in the type, and due to the equality rule for a β-redex, which uses substitution in both term and type. Therefore, syntactic validity is delayed until Section 4 (Corollary 4.17), where substitution will be handled by semantic, rather than syntactic, methods.
Weakening. We can weaken a context Γ by adding bindings or making irrelevant bindings relevant. Formally, we have an order on binding annotations, which is the order induced by : ≤ ÷, and we define weakening by monotonic extension.
A well-formed context ⊢ ∆ extends a well-formed context ⊢ Γ, written ∆ ≤ Γ, if and only if:
Note that this allows to insert new bindings or relax existing ones at any position in Γ, not just at the end.
Proof. Simultaneously by induction on the derivation. Let us look at some cases:
. By (1) and definition of context weakening, ∆ ≤ Γ implies ∆. x⋆U ≤ Γ. x⋆U , so all premises can be appropriately weakened by induction hypothesis.
Examples.
Example 2.3 (Relevance of types).
3 We can extend IITT by a unit type 1 with extensionality principle.
Typed equality allows us to equate all inhabitants of the unit type. As a consequence, the Church numerals over the unit type all coincide, e. g.,
In systems with untyped equality, like ICC * and EPTS, these terms erase to untyped Church-numerals λf λx.x and λf λx. f x and are necessarily distinguished. If we trade the unit type for Bool or any other type with more than one inhabitant, the two terms become different in IITT. This means that in IITT, types are relevant, and we need to reject irrelevant quantification over types like in (X÷Set 0 ) → (X → X) → X → X. In IITT, the polymorphic types of Church numerals are (X :
Example 2.4 (Σ-types). IITT can be readily extended by weak Σ-types.
Additional laws for equality could be considered, like commuting conversions, or the identity (let (x, y) = p in (x, y)) = p. The relevant form (x : U ) × T admits a strong version with projections fst and snd and full extensionality p = (fst p, snd p) : (x : U ) × T . However, strong irrelevant Σ-types (x÷U ) × T are problematic because of the first projection:
With our definition of Γ ⊢ u ÷ U as Γ ÷ ⊢ u : U , this rule is misbehaved: it allows us get hold of an irrelevant value in a relevant context. We could define a closed function π 1 : (x÷U ) × 1 → U , and composing it with ( , ()) : (x÷U ) → (x÷U ) × 1 would give us an identity function of type (x÷U ) → U which magically makes irrelevant things relevant and IITT inconsistent. In this article, we will not further consider strong Σ-types with irrelevant components; we leave the in-depth investigation to future work.
Example 2.5 (Squash type). The squash type ||T || was first introduced in the context of NuPRL [CAB + 86]; it contains exactly one inhabitant iff T is inhabited. Semantically, one obtains ||T || from T by equating all of T 's inhabitants. In IITT, we can define ||T || as internalization of the irrelevance modality, as already suggested by Pfenning [Pfe01] . The
first alternative is via the weak irrelevant Σ-type.
|| || :
It is not hard to see that || || is a monad. All canonical inhabitants of ||T || are definitionally equal:
||T || This is easily shown by expanding the definition of [ ] and using the congruence rule for pairs with an irrelevant first component.
However, we cannot show that all inhabitants of ||T || are definitionally equal, because of the missing extensionality principles for weak Σ. Thus, the second alternative is to add the squash type to IITT via the rules:
Our model (Section 4) is ready to interpret these rules, as well as normalization-by-evaluation inspired models [ACP11] .
Example 2.6 (Subset type). The subset type {x : U | T } is definable from Σ and squash as (x : U ) × ||T ||.
To discuss the next example, we consider a further extension of IITT by Leibniz equality and natural numbers: a ≡ b : Set i for A : Set i and a, b : A refl : a ≡ a for A : Set i and a : A Nat : Set i 0, 1, . . . : Nat +, * : Nat → Nat → Nat.
Example 2.7 (Composite).
4 Let the set of composite numbers {4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, . . . } be numbers that are the product of two natural numbers ≥ 2.
Most composite numbers have several factorizations, and thanks to irrelevance the specific composition is ignored when handling composite numbers. For instance, 12 as product of 3 and 4 is not distinguished from the 12 as product of 2 and 6. 
Example 2.8 (Large eliminations).
5 The ICC * [BB08] or EPTS [MLS08] irrelevant function type (x ÷ A) → B allows x to appear relevantly in B. This extra power raises some issues with large eliminations. Consider
The term t is well-typed in ICC * + T because the domain type of g and the type of a are βη-equal after erasure (−) * of type annotations and irrelevant arguments:
While a Curry view supports this, it is questionable whether identity functions at different types should be viewed as one. It is unclear how a type-directed equality algorithm (see Sec.
3) should proceed here; it needs to recognize that x : Bool is equal to λy : Bool. x y : Bool → Bool. This situation is amplified by a unit type 1 with extensional equality. When we change T true to 1 and the type of a to F ÷ true (λx : 1. ()) then t should still type-check, because λx. () is the identity function on 1. However, η-equality for 1 cannot be checked without types, and a type-directed algorithm would end up checking (successfully) x : Bool for equality with () : 1. This algorithmic equality cannot be transitive, because then any two booleans would be equal. Summarizing, we may conclude that the type of F bears trouble and needs to be rejected. IITT does this because it forbids the irrelevant b in relevant positions such as T b; ICC * lacks T altogether. Extensions of ICC * should at least make sure that b is never eliminated, such as in T b. Technically, T would have to be put in a separate class of recursive functions, those that actually compute with their argument. We leave the interaction of the three different function types to future research.
Algorithmic Equality
The algorithm for checking equality in IITT is inspired by Harper and Pfenning [HP05] . Like theirs, it is type-directed, but we are using the full dependent type and not an erasure to simple types (which would anyway not work due to large eliminations). We give the algorithm in form of judgements and rules in direct correspondence to a functional program.
Algorithmic equality is meant to be used as part of a type checking algorithm. It is the algorithmic counterpart of the definitional conversion rule; in particular, it will only be called on terms that are already know to be well-typed -in fact, types that are well-sorted. We rely on this precondition in the algorithmic formulation.
Algorithmic equality consists of three interleaved judgements. A type equality test checks equality between two types, by inspecting their weak head normal forms. Terms found inside dependent types are reduced and the resulting neutral terms are compared by structural equality. The head variable of such neutrals provides type information that is 5 Inspired by discussions with Ulf Norell during the 11th Agda Implementers' Meeting.
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13 then used to check the (non-normal) arguments using type-directed equality, by reasoning on the (normalized) type structure to perform η-expansions on product types. After enough expansions, a base type is reached, where structural equality is called again, or a sort, at which we use type equality.
Informally, the interleaved reductions are the algorithmic counterparts of the β-equality axiom, the type and structural equalities account for the compatibility rules, and typedirected equality corresponds to the η-equality axiom. The remaining equivalence rules are emergent global properties of the algorithm.
Weak head reduction. Weak head normal forms (whnfs) are given by the following grammar:
Weak head evaluation t ց a and active application f @ ⋆ u ց a are functional relations given by the following rules.
Instead of writing the propositions t ց a and P [a] we will sometimes simply write P [↓t]. Similarly, we might write
. In rules, it is understood that the evaluation judgement is always an extra premise, never an extra conclusion. Algorithmic equality is given as type equality, structural equality, and type-directed equality, which are mutually recursive. The equality algorithm is only invoked on wellformed expressions of the correct type.
Type equality. Type equality ∆ ⊢ A ⇐⇒ A ′ , for weak head normal forms, and ∆ ⊢ T ⇐⇒ T ′ , for arbitrary well-formed types, checks that two given types are equal in their respective contexts.
∆
Note that when invoking structural equality on neutral types N and N ′ , we do not care which type T is returned, since we know by well-formedness that N and N ′ must have the same sort.
Structural equality. Structural equality ∆ ⊢ n ←→ n ′ : A and ∆ ⊢ n ←→ n ′ : T checks the neutral expressions n and n ′ for equality and at the same time infers their type, which is returned as output. Type-directed equality. Type-directed equality ∆ ⊢ t ⇐⇒ t ′ : A and ∆ ⊢ t ⇐⇒ t ′ : T checks terms t and t ′ for equality and proceeds by the structure of the supplied type, to account for η.
Note that in the but-last rule we do not check that the inferred type T of ↓t equals the ascribed type N . Since algorithmic equality is only invoked for well-typed t, we know that this must always be the case. Skipping this test is a conceptually important improvement over Harper and Pfenning [HP05] .
Due to dependent typing, it is not obvious that algorithmic equality is symmetric and transitive. For instance, consider symmetry in case of application: We have to show that ∆ ⊢ n ′ u ′ ←→ n u : T [u/x], but using the induction hypothesis we obtain this equality only at type T [u ′ /x]. To conclude, we need to convert types, which is only valid if we know that u and u ′ are actually equal. Thus, we need soundness of algorithmic equality to show its transitivity. Soundness w. r. t. declarative equality requires subject reduction, which is not trivial, due to its dependency on function type injectivity. In the next section (4), we construct by a Kripke logical relation which gives us subject reduction and soundness of algorithmic equality (Section 5), and, finally, symmetry and transitivity of algorithmic equality.
A simple fact about algorithmic equality is that the inferred types are unique up to syntactic equality (where we consider α-convertible expressions as identical). Also, they only depend on the left hand side neutral term n.
Lemma 3.1 (Uniqueness of inferred types).
(1) If ∆ ⊢ n ←→ n 1 : A 1 and ∆ ⊢ n ←→ n 2 :
Extending structural equality to irrelevance, we let
A Kripke Logical Relation for Soundness
In this section, we construct a Kripke logical relation in the spirit of Goguen [Gog00] and Vanderwaart and Crary [VC02] that proves weak head normalization, function type injectivity, and subject reduction plus syntactical properties like substitution in judgements and syntactical validity. As an important consequence, we obtain soundness of algorithmic equality w. r. t. definitional equality. This allows us to establish that algorithmic equality on well-typed terms is a partial equivalence relation. 4.1. An Induction Measure. Following Goguen [Gog94] and previous work [ACD08] , we first define a semantic universe hierarchy U i whose sole purpose is to provide a measure for defining a logical relation and proving some of its properties. The limit U ω corresponds to the proof-theoretic strength or ordinal of IITT.
We denote sets of expressions by A, B and functions from expressions to sets of expressions by F. Let A = {t | ↓t ∈ A} denote the closure of A by weak head expansion. The dependent function space is defined as Π A F = {f ∈ Whnf | ∀u ∈ A. f @ u ∈ F(u)}.
By recursion on i ∈ N we define inductively sets U i ⊆ Whnf × P(Whnf) as follows [ACD08, Sec. 5.1]:
Only interested in computational strength, we treat relevant and irrelevant function spaces alikeat the level of predicates A, irrelevance is anyhow not observable, only by relations as given later.
The induction measure A ∈ Set i shall now mean the minimum height of a derivation of (A, A) ∈ U i for some A. Note that due to universe stratification, A ∈ Set i is smaller than Set i ∈ Set j .
4.2.
A Kripke Logical Relation. Let ∆ ⊢ t :=: t ′ ⋆ T stand for the conjunction of the propositions
• ∆ ⊢ t ⋆ T and ∆ ⊢ t ′ ⋆ T , and • ∆ ⊢ t = t ′ ⋆ T . By induction on A ∈ s we define two Kripke relations
together with their respective closures and the generalization to ⋆. For better readability, the clauses are given in rule form meaning that the conclusion is defined as the conjunction of the premises. ∀ and =⇒ are meta-level quantification and implication, respectively. Proof. By induction on A ∈ s and T ∈ s, resp.
Lemma 4.2 (Type conversion). (1) If
Proof. Simultaneously induction in A ∈ s and T ∈ s, resp. We show the "if" direction, the "only if" follows analogously. The interesting case is the one of functions. Case
s,s ′ → T ′ , holds because of the conversion rule for typing and equality. Now assume arbitrary Γ ≤ ∆ and (
Proof. We generalize the two statements to whnfs ∆ ⊢ A A : s and prove all four statements simultaneously by induction in A ∈ s and T ∈ s, resp. Case Let us look at the case for functions.
A. ABEL AND G. SCHERER Case Transitivity:
By transitivity we have ∆ ⊢ (x⋆U 1 ) → T 1 :=: (x⋆U 3 ) → T 3 : s 3 and ∆ ⊢ U 1 U 3 : s 1 by induction hypothesis on s 1 . Note that this is where the arrow sort annotations are useful. Without them we would not know that the sorts in both derivations are equal. We could have ∆ ⊢ U 1 U 2 : s 1 and ∆ ⊢ U 2 U 3 : s ′ 1 for apparently unrelated s 1 and s ′ 1 , and would therefore be unable to use transitivity. Given Γ ≤ ∆ and Γ ⊢ u u ′ ⋆ U 1 , we need to show that
As at type U is a PER by induction hypothesis, we have Γ ⊢ u u⋆U 1 , from which we can deduce
This allows us to conclude by transitivity at type s 2 .
In the following we show that the variables are in the logical relation, i. e., ∆ ⊢ x x : ∆(x) for well-formed contexts ∆. As usual, this statement has to be generalized to neutrals n to be proven inductively.
Lemma 4.4 (Into the logical relation). Let
Proof. By induction on T ∈ s. Case N ∈ s and ∆ ⊢ n :=: n ′ ⋆ N . Then ∆ ⊢ n n ′ ⋆ N by cases on ⋆, unfolding definitions. Case s ∈ s ′ and ∆ ⊢ N :=: N ′ ⋆ s. Then ∆ ⊢ N N ′ ⋆ s by cases on ⋆. Case (x⋆U ) → T ∈ s 3 and ∆ ⊢ n :=:
First, the case for ⋆ 0 = :. We have ∆ ⊢ n :=: n ′ : (x⋆U ) → T . Assume arbitrary Γ ≤ ∆ and Γ ⊢ u u ′ ⋆ U , which yields Γ ⊢ u :=:
The case for ⋆ 0 = ÷ proceeds analogously.
4.3. Validity in the Model. We now extend our logical relation to substitutions, by induction on the destination context.
This relation inherits weakening from for terms. We then define the context ( Γ), type (Γ T = T ′ ) and term (Γ t = t ′ : T ) validity relations, by induction on the length of contexts.
T Because of its asymmetric definition, the logical relation on substitutions may not be a PER in general, but it is for valid contexts.
Lemma 4.5 (Substitution relation is a PER). If
Γ, then ∆ ⊢ : Γ is symmetric and transitive.
Proof. By induction on Γ. We demonstrate symmetry for the case Γ. x⋆U .
By induction hypothesis, ∆ ⊢ σ ′ σ : Γ, and by symmetry of for terms (Lemma 4.3), ∆ ⊢ σ ′ (x) σ(x) ⋆ U σ. We instantiate Γ U to ∆ ⊢ U σ U σ ′ : s and conclude ∆ ⊢ σ ′ (x) σ(x) ⋆ U σ ′ by conversion (Lemma 4.2).
Lemma 4.6 (Validity is a PER). The relation Γ = :
T is symmetric and transitive.
Proof. Symmetry requires symmetry of for substitutions and conversion with ∆ ⊢ T σ T σ ′ : s ′ , similar as in Lemma 4.5. We demonstrate transitivity in detail. Given Γ t 1 = t 2 : T and Γ t 2 = t 3 : T we show Γ t 1 = t 3 : T . Clearly, Γ and Γ T or T = s by one of our two assumptions. Assume arbitrary ∆ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ and show ∆ ⊢ t 1 σ t 3 σ ′ : T σ. By Lemma 4.5, ∆ ⊢ σ σ : Γ, thus ∆ ⊢ t 1 σ t 2 σ : T σ. Also, ∆ ⊢ t 2 σ t 3 σ ′ : T σ which entails our goal by transitivity of (Lemma 4.3).
Lemma 4.7 (Function type injectivity is valid). If Γ (x⋆U )
Proof. Assume arbitrary ∆ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ. We have ∆ ⊢ (x⋆U σ)
, thus by definition s 1 = s ′ 1 and s 2 = s ′ 2 and ∆ ⊢ U ′ σ ′ U σ : s 1 -note that sorts are closed and therefore invariant by substitution. By symmetry of , and since ∆, σ, σ ′ were arbitrary, we have Γ U = U ′ : s 1 .
Further, assume arbitrary ∆ ⊢ u u ′ ⋆ U ′ σ and let ρ = (σ, u/x) and ρ ′ = (σ ′ , u ′ /x). Note that w. l. o. g., x ∈ dom(Γ) and x ∈ FV(U ′ ) and ∆ ⊢ ρ ρ ′ : Γ. x⋆U ′ . We have ∆ ⊢ T ρ T ′ ρ ′ : s 2 and since ρ, ρ ′ were arbitrary, Γ. x⋆U ′ T = T ′ : s 2 .
Lemma 4.8 (Context satisfiable). If
Γ then ⊢ Γ and Γ ⊢ id id : Γ.
Proof. By induction on Γ. The ⋄ case is immediate. In the Γ. x⋆U case, given
From the induction hypothesis Γ ⊢ id id : Γ, we obtain the first premise by weakening of . It also yields Γ ⊢ U id : sid for some s by definition of Γ U . Using induction hypothesis, ⊢ Γ, this entails ⊢ Γ. x⋆U . Further, Γ. x⋆U ⊢ x = x ⋆ U , and since trivially Γ. x⋆U ⊢ x ←→ x⋆U , we can derive Γ. x⋆U ⊢ x x⋆U , by the Lemma 4.4. This concludes the second premise Γ. x⋆U ⊢ id(x) id(x) ⋆ U id.
We can now show that every equation valid in the model is derivable in IITT.
Theorem 4.9 (Completeness of IITT rules). If Γ t = t ′ : T then both Γ ⊢ t : T and Γ ⊢ t ′ : T and Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T and Γ ⊢ T .
Proof. Using Lemma 4.8 we obtain Γ ⊢ t t ′ : T , which entails Γ ⊢ t, t ′ : T and Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T . Analogously, since our assumption entails Γ T by definition, we get Γ ⊢ T .
Fundamental theorem.
We prove a series of lemmata which constitute parts of the fundamental theorem for the Kripke logical relation.
Lemma 4.10 (Resurrection). If
Proof. By induction on Γ, the interesting case being
First, we show ∆ ÷ ⊢ σ σ : (Γ ÷ . x : U ). By induction hypothesis ∆ ÷ ⊢ σ σ : Γ ÷ , and by definition, ∆ ÷ ⊢ σ(x) σ(x) : U σ. This immediately entails our goal.
For the second goal ∆ ÷ ⊢ σ ′ σ ′ : (Γ ÷ . x : U ), observe that Γ U , hence ∆ ⊢ U σ U σ ′ : s for some sort s. Thus, we can cast our hypothesis ∆ ⊢ σ ′ (x) σ ′ (x) : U σ to U σ ′ and conclude analogously. Proof. In case ⋆ = : it holds by definition, but we need resurrection for ⋆ = ÷. If ∆ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ, then by resurrection (Lemma 4.10) we have ∆ ÷ ⊢ σ σ : Γ ÷ , so from Γ ÷ u : U we deduce ∆ ÷ ⊢ uσ uσ : U σ. Analogously we get ∆ ÷ ⊢ uσ ′ uσ ′ : U σ ′ which we cast to ∆ ÷ ⊢ uσ ′ uσ ′ : U σ.
Lemma 4.12 (Validity of β-reduction).
Γ is contained in the first hypothesis Γ u ⋆ U . Then, given ∆ ⊢ ρ ρ ′ : Γ we need to show ∆ ⊢ (λx⋆U.
Let σ = (ρ, uρ/x) and σ ′ = (ρ ′ , uρ ′ /x). From the second hypothesis and Cor. 4.11 we get ∆ ⊢ uρ uρ ′ ⋆ U ρ, which gives ∆ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ. x⋆U . By instantiating the first hypothesis we get ∆ ⊢ tσ tσ ′ : T σ, and also (from the premise Γ. x⋆U T ) ∆ ⊢ T σ = T σ ′ , which
Finally, from ∆ ⊢ tσ tσ ′ we get the desired ∆ ⊢ (λx⋆U. t)ρ ⋆ uρ tσ ′ : T σ, as is closed by weak head expansion to well-typed ∆ ⊢ (λx⋆U. t)ρ ⋆ uρ : T σ.
Lemma 4.13 (Validity of η).
Proof.
Γ and Γ (x⋆U ) → T are direct consequences of our hypothesis. Given ∆ ⊢ ρ ρ ′ : Γ, we need to show ∆ ⊢ tρ (λx⋆U. t ⋆ x)ρ ′ : ((x⋆U ) → T )ρ. W. l. o. g., x is not free in the domain nor range of substitutions ρ and ρ ′ , thus with t ′ := tρ, t ′′ := tρ ′ , U ′ := U ρ, U ′′ := U ρ ′ , T ′ := T ρ and
This logical relation at a function type, when instantiated to (∆ ′ , u, u ′ ), gives us ∆ ′ ⊢ t ′ ⋆ u t ′′ ⋆ u ′ : T ′ [u/x], which weak-head expands to the desired goal.
Second, we show ∆ ⊢ t ′ :=: λx⋆U ′′ . t ′′ ⋆ x : (x⋆U ′ ) → T ′ .
• Γ ⊢ t ′ : (x⋆U ′ ) → T ′ is a simple consequence of our hypothesis Γ t : (x⋆U ) → T .
• Γ ⊢ λx⋆U ′′ . t ′′ ⋆ x : (x⋆U ′ ) → T ′ has the following proof:
The η-rule of definitional equality gives us ∆ ⊢ t ′′ = λx⋆U ′′ . t ′′ ⋆ x : (x⋆U ′′ ) → T ′′ . From Γ (x⋆U ) → T we can convert it to the type (x⋆U ′ ) → T ′ , and then conclude by transitivity using ∆ ⊢ t ′ = t ′′ : (x⋆U ′ ) → T ′ , which is a direct consequence of Γ t : (x⋆U ) → T .
Lemma 4.14 (Validity of function equality).
Proof. Again Γ and Γ (x⋆U ) → T are simple consequences of our hypotheses. Given ∆ ⊢ ρ ρ ′ : Γ (w. l. o. g., x is not free in ρ, ρ ′ domain or range), we need to show 
We will skip the proof of ∆ ⊢ (λx⋆U ρ. tρ) :=: (λx⋆U ′ ρ ′ . t ′ ρ ′ ) : ((x⋆U ρ) → T ρ), as it is similar to the corresponding part of the η-validity lemma.
Given (∆ ′ , u, u ′ ) such that ∆ ′ ≤ ∆ and ∆ ′ ⊢ u u ′ ⋆ U ρ, we have to show that
. Let σ = (ρ, u/x) and σ ′ = (ρ ′ , u ′ /x). As we supposed ∆ ′ ⊢ u u ′ ⋆ U ρ, we have ∆ ′ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ. x⋆U ρ. Instantiating the second hypothesis with ∆ ′ , σ, σ ′ therefore gives us ∆ ′ ⊢ tσ = t ′ σ ′ : T σ, which can also be written
, which is weak-head expansible to our goal.
Lemma 4.15 (Validity of irrelevant application).
uρ : U ρ from the second hypothesis. Analogously, we obtain ∆ ÷ ⊢ u ′ ρ ′ u ′ ρ ′ : U ρ ′ from the third hypothesis which we can cast to U ρ by virtue of Γ U which we get from Γ (x÷U ) → T by Lemma 4.7.
Theorem 4.16 (Fundamental theorem of logical relations).
(
Proof. By induction on the derivation.
As a simple corollary we obtain syntactic validity, namely that definitional equality implies well-typedness and well-typedness implies well-formedness of the involved type. This lemma could have been proven purely syntactically, but the syntactic proof requires a sequence of carefully arranged lemmata like context conversion, substitution, functionality, and inversion on types [HP05, AC07] . Our "sledgehammer" semantic argument is built into the Kripke logical relation, in the spirit of Goguen [Gog00] .
Corollary 4.17 (Syntactic validity
Proof. By the fundamental theorem, Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T implies Γ t = t ′ : T , which by Thm. 4.9 implies Γ ⊢ t, t ′ : T and Γ ⊢ T .
Meta-theoretic Consequences of the Model Construction
In this section, we explicate the results established by the Kripke model. 5.1. Admissibility of Substitution. Goguen [Gog00] observes that admissibility of substitution for the syntactic judgements can be inherited from the Kripke logical relation, which is closed under substitution by its very definition.
To show that the judgements of IITT are closed under substitution we introduce relations Γ ⊢ σ : Γ ′ for substitution typing and Γ ⊢ σ = σ ′ : Γ ′ for substitution equality which are given inductively by the following rules:
x⋆U Substitution typing and equality are closed under weakening.
Semantically, substitutions are explained by environments. We define substitution validity as follows, again in rule form but not inductively:
Proof. We demonstrate 2 by induction on
We have Γ and Γ ′ by induction hypothesis and Γ ′ U by Thm. 4.16, thus, Γ ′ . x⋆U . Now assume arbitrary ∆ ⊢ ρ ρ ′ : Γ and show ∆ ⊢ σρ σ ′ ρ ′ : Γ ′ . x⋆U . First, ∆ ⊢ σρ σ ′ ρ ′ : Γ ′ follows by induction hypothesis. The second subgoal ∆ ⊢ (σρ)(x) (σ ′ ρ ′ )(x) ⋆ U σρ is just an instance of the second induction hypothesis.
Theorem 5.2 (Substitution and functionality).
( Proof. We demonstrate 4, the other cases are just variations of the theme. First, from Γ ⊢ σ = σ ′ : Γ ′ we get Γ ⊢ σ σ ′ : Γ ′ by the fundamental lemma for substitutions (Lemma 5.1), using the identity environment Γ ⊢ id id : Γ. Now, by the fundamental theorem on Γ ⊢ t = t ′ : T we obtain Γ ⊢ tσ t ′ σ ′ : T σ, which entails our goal Γ ⊢ tσ = t ′ σ ′ : T σ by Thm. 4.9.
Context conversion.
Context equality ⊢ Γ = Γ ′ is defined inductively by the rules
All declarative judgements are closed under context conversion. This fact is easy to prove by induction over derivations, but we get it as just a special case of substitution.
Proof. By Thm. 5.2 with Γ ′ ⊢ id = id : Γ.
As a consequence, context equality is symmetric and transitive (we can trade Γ ⊢ U = U ′ for Γ ′ ⊢ U = U ′ ). Thus, context conversion can be applied in the other direction as well.
5.3. Inversion, injectivity, and type unicity. A condition for the decidability of type checking is the ability to invert typing derivations. The proof requires substitution.
T then Γ ⊢ U : s 1 and Γ. x⋆U ⊢ T ′ : s 2 , and for some s 3 we have Γ ⊢ s 3 = T and (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ Rule.
Proof. Each by induction on the typing derivation.
Remark 5.6. The need for inversion during type checking is the only good reason to have separate typing rules and not simply define typing Γ ⊢ t : T as the diagonal Γ ⊢ t = t : T of equality. While by a logical relation argument we will obtain a suitable inversion result for Γ ⊢ (x⋆U ) → T = (x⋆U ) → T -the famous function type injectivity (Theorem 5.7)-it seems hard to get something similar for application t u.
Injectivity for function types w. r. t. typed equality is known to be tricky. It is connected to subject reduction and required for many meta-theoretic results. We harvest it from our Kripke model. Theorem 5.7 (Function type injectivity). If Γ ⊢ (x⋆U )
1 and s 2 = s ′ 2 and Γ ⊢ U = U ′ : s 1 and Γ. x⋆U ⊢ T = T ′ : s 2 . Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.7. Or we can prove it directly as follows: Since Γ ⊢ id id : Γ we have by the fundamental theorem Γ ⊢ (x⋆U )
→ T ′ : s 3 which by inversion yields first s 1 = s ′ 1 and s 2 = s ′ 2 and Γ ⊢ U U ′ : s 1 and Γ ⊢ U = U ′ : s 1 . Since Γ. x⋆U ⊢ x x⋆U , we also obtain Γ. x⋆U ⊢ T T ′ : s 2 and conclude Γ. x⋆U ⊢ T = T ′ : s 2 .
From the inversion lemma we can prove uniqueness of types, since we are dealing with a functional PTS, and we have function type injectivity.
Theorem 5.8 (Type unicity). If Γ ⊢ t : T and Γ ⊢ t :
Proof. By induction on t, using inversion.
Normalization and Subject
Reduction. An immediate consequence of the model construction is that each term has a weak head normal form and that typing and equality is preserved by weak head normalization.
Theorem 5.9 (Normalization and subject reduction). If Γ ⊢ t : T then t ց a and Γ ⊢ t = a : T .
Proof. By the fundamental theorem, Γ ⊢ t t : T which by definition contains a derivation of Γ ⊢ t = ↓t : T . 5.5. Consistency. Importantly, not every type is inhabited in IITT, thus, it can be used as a logic. A prerequisite is that types can be distinguished, which follows immediately from the construction of the logical relation.
Lemma 5.10 (Type constructor discrimination). Neutral types, sorts and function types are mutually unequal.
Proof. By the fundamental theorem applied to the identity substitution. For instance, assuming Γ ⊢ N = s : s ′ we get Γ ⊢ N s : s ′ but this is a contradiction to the definition of .
From normalization and type constructor discrimination we can show that not every type is inhabited.
Theorem 5.11 (Consistency). X : Set 0 ⊢ t : X.
Proof. Let Γ = (X : Set 0 ). Assuming Γ ⊢ t : X, we have Γ ⊢ a : X for the whnf a of t. We invert on the typing of a. By Lemma 5.10, X cannot be equal to a function type or sort, thus, a can neither be a λ nor a function type nor a sort, it can only be neutral. The only variable X must be in the head of a, but since X is not of function type, it cannot be applied. Thus, a ≡ X and Γ ⊢ X : X, implying Γ ⊢ X = Set 0 by inversion (Lemma 5.5). This is in contradiction to Lemma 5.10! 5.6. Soundness of Algorithmic Equality. Soundness of the equality algorithm is a consequence of subject reduction.
Theorem 5.12 (Soundness of algorithmic equality).
Proof. Generalize the theorem to all six algorithmic equality judgments and prove it by induction on the algorithmic equality derivation. Since we have subject reduction, the proof proceeds mechanically, because each algorithmic rule corresponds, modulo weak head normalization, to a declarative rule. 5.7. Symmetry and Transitivity of Algorithmic Equality. Since algorithmic equality is sound for well-typed terms, it is also symmetric and transitive.
Lemma 5.13 (Type and context conversion in algorithmic equality).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of algorithmic equality, where we extend the statements to ←→ and ⇐⇒ accordingly.
(1) Type equality.
Case
By inversion, ∆ ⊢ U, U ′ and by induction hypothesis, ∆ ′ ⊢ U ⇐⇒ U ′ . Again by inversion, ∆. x⋆U ⊢ T and ∆. x⋆U ′ ⊢ T ′ , yet by soundness of algorithmic equality, ∆ ⊢ U = U ′ , hence ∆. x⋆U ⊢ T ′ by context conversion. Further, ⊢ ∆. x⋆U = ∆ ′ . x⋆U . Thus, we can apply the other induction hypothesis to obtain ∆ ′ . x⋆U ⊢ T ⇐⇒ T ′ , which finally yields
Lemma 5.14 (Algorithmic equality is transitive). Let ⊢ ∆ = ∆ ′ . In the following, let the terms submitted to algorithmic equality be well-typed.
(1) If ∆ ⊢ n 1 ←→ n 2 : T and ∆ ′ ⊢ n 2 ←→ n 3 : T ′ then ∆ ⊢ n 1 ←→ n 3 : T and
Proof. We extend these statements to ←→ and ⇐⇒ and prove them simultaneously by induction on the first derivation.
By induction hypothesis we have ∆ ⊢ n 1 ←→ n 3 : (x : U )
, and ∆ ⊢ U = U ′ : s 1 by function type injectivity (Thm. 5.7). By induction hypothesis we can then deduce ∆ ⊢ u 1 ⇐⇒ u 3 : U , and therefore conclude ∆ ⊢ n 1 u 1 ←→ n 3 u 3 :
We get ∆ ⊢ U 1 ⇐⇒ U 3 : s 1 by transitivity. To also get ∆. x⋆U 1 ⊢ T 1 ⇐⇒ T 3 : s 2 we need ⊢ ∆. x⋆U 2 = ∆. x⋆U 1 , but this stems from ∆ ⊢ U 1 ⇐⇒ U 2 : s 1 by soundness of algorithmic equality.
Theorem 5.15. The algorithmic equality relations are PERs on well-typed expressions.
Proof. By Lemma 5.14 and an analogous proof of symmetry.
A Kripke Logical Relation for Completeness
The only open issues in the meta-theory of IITT are completeness and termination of algorithmic equality. In parts, completeness has been established in the last section already, namely, we have shown injectivity and discrimination for type constructors. What is missing is injectivity and discrimination for neutrals, e. g., if ∆ ⊢ n u = n ′ u ′ :
In untyped λ-calculus, this is an instance of Boehm's theorem [Bar84] . We follow Coquand [Coq91] and Harper and Pfenning [HP05] and prove it by constructing a second Kripke logical relation, c , for completeness which is very similar to the first one, , but at base types additionally requires algorithmic equality to hold. After proving the fundamental lemma again, we know that definitionally equal terms are also algorithmically so. As a consequence, equality is decidable in IITT, and so is type checking. 6.1. Another Kripke Logical Relation. Again, by induction on A ∈ s we define two Kripke relations ∆ ⊢ A c A ′ : s ∆ ⊢ a c a ′ : A.
together with their respective closures c and the generalization to ⋆. This time, however, at base types we will additionally require algorithmic equality to hold, more precisely, the relation ∆ ⊢ t :⇐⇒: t ′ : T which stands for the conjunction of the propositions • ∆ ⊢ t : T and ∆ ⊢ t ′ : T , and Note that in the definition of ∆ ⊢ f c f ′ : (x⋆U ) → T we did not require f and f ′ to be algorithmically equal. This would hinder the proof of the fundamental theorem for c , since algorithmic equality is not closed under application by definition-it will follow from the fundamental theorem, though. In the next lemma we shall prove that f and f ′ are algorithmically equal if they are related by c . The name Escape Lemma was coined by Jeffrey Sarnat [SS08] . which can only be checked in the presence of type T . Realizing such η-laws gives additional "proof" irrelevance which is not covered by Pfenning's irrelevant quantification (x÷U ) → T .
Internal erasure. Terms u÷U in irrelevant position are only there to please the type checker, they are ignored during equality checking. This can be inferred from the substitution principle: If Γ. x÷U ⊢ T and Γ ⊢ u, u ′ ÷ U , then Γ ⊢ T [u/x] = T [u ′ /x]; the type T has the same shape regardless of u, u ′ . Hence, terms like u serve the sole purpose to prove some proposition and could be replaced by a dummy • immediately after type-checking.
Internal erasure can be realized by making Γ ⊢ t ÷ T a judgement (as opposed to just a notation for Γ ÷ ⊢ t : T ) and adding the rule
The rule states that if there is already a proof t of T , then • is a new proof of T . This preserves provability while erasing the proof terms. Conservativity of this rule can be proven as in joint work of the author with Coquand and Pagano [ACP11] .
Conclusions
We have extended Pfenning's notion of irrelevance to a type theory IITT with universes that accommodates types defined by recursion. We have constructed a Kripke model that shows soundness of IITT, yielding normalization, subject reduction and consistency, plus syntactical properties of the judgements of IITT. A second Kripke logical relation c has proven correctness of algorithmic equality and, thus, decidability of IITT.
Integrating irrelevance and data types in dependent type theory does not seem without challenges. We have succeeded to treat Pfenning's notion of irrelevance, but our proof does not scale directly to parametric function types, a stronger notion of irrelevant function types called implicit quantification by Miquel [Miq01b] .
7 Two more type theories build on Miquel's calculus [Miq01a] , Barras and Bernardo's ICC * [BB08] and Mishra-Linger and Sheard's Erasure Pure Type Systems (EPTS) [MLS08] , but none has offered a satisfying account of large eliminations yet. Miquel's model [Miq00] features data types only as impredicative encodings. For irrelevant, parametric, and recursive functions to coexist it seems like three different function types are necessary, e. g., in the style of Pfenning's irrelevance, extensionality and intensionality. We would like to solve this puzzle in future work, not least to implement high-performance languages with dependent types.
